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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of migration duration focusing on family
composition and human capital. A utility maximization model is built to show that
migrants face a trade-off between avoiding psychic costs from leaving family members
and accumulating wealth to support their consumption. The empirical analysis on
Mexican men’s US experience carried out using the hazard model shows that marriage
and children, which imply a heavier financial burden, are negatively associated with
migrants’ duration in the USA. Fathers with more young children under age 12 stay
even shorter, because taking care of them is time intensive.
Jel codes: F22; O15; J12
Keywords: Family composition, Psychic costs, Human capital, Cox proportional hazard
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1 Introduction
Economic incentives, including the wage differentials and the difference in living costs,
determine the length of migration duration (Dustmann 2003b; Reyes 2001). In the mean-
time, psychic costs, which exist throughout migrants’ stay in the host country, also play a
critical role.
People genuinely enjoy the company of family members and friends. Traveling to a new
place and leaving familiar surroundings involve psychic costs, which are different from
monetary costs and difficult to measure. The psychic costs of most economic migrants
come from staying abroad without the company of their family members. Also, the migra-
tion decision could be a family decision (Mincer 1978). The relationships between family
composition, psychic costs, and the length of migration duration, which have not been
widely researched, merit further exploration.
Dustmann (2003a) reports that parents’ return intentions respond differently to chil-
dren’s gender. Bijwaard and van Doeselaar (2014) indicate that divorce and remarriage
increase return of family migrants from less-developed countries and decrease return
from developed countries. Themodel in Dustmann (2003a) presumes children travel with
their parents, but this is not a very common case for temporary economic migrants, such
© 2016 Li. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
indicate if changes were made.
Li IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:2 Page 2 of 28
as many Mexican migrants in the USA. Economic migrants seeking for economic oppor-
tunities in the host country account for a big proportion of migrant population, while they
are not discussed by Bijwaard and van Doeselaar (2014).
My paper contributes to the literature by showing that, facing a trade-off between
low psychic costs and high household consumption levels, migrants make duration deci-
sions based on their marital status, the number of children, and the age and the gender
of children. Most economic migrants are not financially desperate and they value fam-
ily time as they do wealth, thus family composition plays a role at least as important as
economic motivations. The empirical study, employing the hazard model (survival anal-
ysis) to analyze the determinants of migration duration of male Mexican migrants in the
US, supports my hypotheses. Marriage and children shorten migrants’ foreign experi-
ence. Different from family migrants in Netherlands (Bijwaard and van Doeselaar 2014),
Mexican migrants stay longer in the USA if they are divorced, single or in a consensual
union, compared to married migrants. Different from immigrant in Germany (Dustmann
2003a), Mexican fathers’ US duration does not differ significantly by the gender of chil-
dren, although it seems that fathers prefer to return sooner from the USA for the presence
of sons, rather than daughters.
The fact that human capital affects individual’s psychic costs and wage rates provides
a new perspective on the relationship between education level and migration duration,
which differs by country of origin in the literature (Dustmann and Görlach 2014). Regard-
ing Mexico-US migration, the empirical results indicate the existence of a threshold year
of schooling: the length of migration increases as years of schooling rise from low levels
to around 11 years, and then declines as years of schooling increase to levels above the
threshold.
Other determinants, including migrants’ legal status and economic conditions, are
also considered. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
hypotheses and builds a utility maximization model to analyze how family composition
and human capital affect migration duration. Section 3 shows the Mexican Migration
Project (MMP) data and the empirical strategy—the hazard model. Section 4 displays
results. Section 5 is a summary and discussion.
2 Hypotheses and utility maximization
Many migrants move to the destination for economic opportunities rather than family
reunion. Their family members usually wait in the home country because of the higher
living costs in the destination, especially when migrants plan to return. As migrants accu-
mulate human capital and host country currency, they have to deal with the psychic costs
associated with leaving their families at the same time, which decrease their utility in the
host country. Therefore, they face a trade-off between offering financial support to the
family and avoiding psychic costs.
2.1 Optimal duration
A simple model can be developed to illustrate the relationships among psychic costs, fam-
ily composition, and optimal migration duration. Following Dustmann (2003b), assume
migrants enter a more developed country at time point 0 and standardize their life span
to 1. They decide to stay in the host country for a time period, t, to maximize their
lifetime utility, U. I bring family members to the framework and consider a family unit
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consisting of a migrant and N other family members.1 Suffering psychic costs from being
separated from family members, the migrant’s utility in the host country discounts at a
discounting factor s(N). It also denotes the percentage of utility that the migrant finally
obtains; 0 ≤ s(N) ≤ 1. As more family members present in the household, the percentage
decreases: s′(N) < 0. The lifetime utility becomes:
U = tν(Cf ,α)s(N) + (1 − t)ν(Ch,β) (1)
where ν is the utility function for migrants. Cf indicates the migrant’s consumption in the
host country (foreign country), and Ch is the migrant’s consumption in the home country.
α and β give the preference of this migrant for consumption in the host country and home
country, respectively. It is assumed that migrants enjoy consumption in the home country
more: β > α. Marginal utilities are positive: ν′f (Cf ,α) > 0 and ν′h(Ch,β) > 0. Diminishing
marginal utility suggests that ν′′f (Cf ,α) < 0 and ν′′h (Ch,β) < 0 (Dustmann 2003b).
Migrants maximize their lifetime utility with respect to Cf , Ch, and t, subject to the
inter-temporal budget constraint:
twf + (1 − t)wh − tCf − (1 − t)pCh − pCˆhN = 0 (2)
where wf and wh indicate wage rates in the host country and home country, respectively;
p denotes the price for consumption in the home country, relative to the host country. If
consumption in the foreign country ismore costly than consumption in the home country,
p < 1. Migrants give a fixed amount of money to each family member, Cˆh. For example, if
a migrant has several children in the home country, the costs of raising each child could
be roughly fixed, although later we will see that the costs of raising children change by
their age and gender.
Solving the utility maximization problem with the budget constraint, the First Order
Conditions (FOCs) are
ν(Cf ,α)s(N) − ν(Ch,β) + λ(wf − wh − Cf + pCh) = 0 (3)
ν′(Cf ,α)s(N) − λ = 0 (4)
ν′(Ch,β) − pλ = 0 (5)
where λ denotes the marginal utility of wealth: λ > 0.
Equation (3) is the equilibrium condition, which determines the optimal migration
duration. wf −wh −Cf + pCh > 0, because an additional unit of time in the host country
increases a migrant’s lifetime wealth (Dustmann 2003b). ν(Ch,β)−ν(Cf ,α)s(N) > 0, this
suggests that the forgone utility of staying a further unit of time abroad is positive because
migrants cannot consume goods in the home country (β > α) and they miss family mem-
bers. Combining these FOCs with Eq. (2), the optimal duration in the host country can
be solved.
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where  = wf − wh − Cf + pCh > 0.
Then ∂t
∂wh < 0, the higher the wage rates in the home country, the shorter the migrants
would stay in the host country. But the sign of ∂t
∂wf is ambiguous. If the wage rates in the
host country are higher, the income effect encourages migrants to return sooner, but the
substitution effect suggests migrants to stay longer in the host country to enjoy the wealth
(Dustmann 2003b).
The focus is on the sign of ∂t
∂N . The first part on the right hand side of Eq. (6) is neg-
ative, since s′(N) < 0 and  > 0, while the formula in brackets is negative because
of the diminishing marginal utility assumption. The second part, pCˆh

, is positive. If the
financial costs of supporting family members in the home country, Cˆh, are sufficiently
high, ∂t
∂N could be positive, migrants would stay longer in the host country to accu-
mulate money for family members’ consumption. When the absolute value of marginal
discounting factor, s′(N), is high enough, ∂t
∂N could be negative: an extra family mem-
ber leads to a great decrease in the entire utility in the host country, migrants return
sooner.
In the above model, these family members refer to children appropriately, because
they are assumed to have zero income. In fact, changing the setup of the
model does not change the implication greatly as I include adult family members’
income.
Assume family members have an income,wm, in the home country (m is short for mem-
ber). Relax the assumption of a fixed amount of financial support to family members.
Assume family members’ consumption at home, Cm, affects migrants’ lifetime utility.
Then migrants make decisions over Cm, as well as t, Cf , and Ch, to maximize the utility
function:
U = tν(Cf ,α)s(N) + (1 − t)ν(Ch,β) + ν(Cm, γ )N (9)
with the budget constraint:
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Again, the term in brackets is negative and the sign of ∂t
∂N is ambiguous. If these family
members can fully financially support themselves, wm −pCm > 0, then ∂t∂N < 0, migrants
with more family members have shorter stays. Once the migrants need to offer financial
support to these family members, wm − pCm < 0, migrants with more family members
may have to stay longer, suffering the psychic costs, if ∂t
∂N > 0.
Combining Eqs. (6) and (11), the number of family members can be divided
into i different groups, gi, based on their income and consumption. The sign of
∂t
∂Ngi
is decided by the change in utility caused by psychic costs and the finan-
cial conditions of family members in each group. Regarding the family composition,
migrants face a trade-off between avoiding high psychic costs and improving household
consumption.
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2.2 Marital status
Hypothesis 1: Unmarried migrants stay longer in the destination country than married
migrants.
In Eq. (11), when the migrants are unmarried, N = 0 and wm − pCm = 0, then
∂t
∂N |N=0 < 0. Married migrants whose spouses earn more than their consumption face
wm − pCm > 0, then ∂t∂N |N=1 < 0. Married migrants (N = 1) will stay shorter than
unmarried migrants (N = 0).
If married migrants’ spouses cannot afford to live on their own, wm − pCm < 0, the
sign of ∂t
∂N |N=1 is ambiguous. If it is negative, hypothesis 1 holds. If it is positive, there is a
N∗ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying ∂t
∂N |N=N∗ = 0, then the effect of marriage on the length of duration
is an empirical question.
The fact that most migrants are males rather than females, especially in Mexico-US
migration, is consistent with the model to some degree. Traditionally, men support the
family financially while women do most of the housework (Becker 1985). This labor divi-
sion in a family suggests a low labor market participation of women. Married women with
their husbands supporting the family financially may not migrate (wm − pCm > 0, t = 0),
while married men, compared to women, are more willing to migrate to accumulate
human capital and wealth (wm − pCm < 0, t > 0).
2.3 Children
2.3.1 Number of children
Hypothesis 2: With more children in the home country, migrants have shorter migration
stays than those with fewer children do.
Migrants with no child face zero psychic costs from being concerned about their chil-
dren: in Eq. (6), ∂t
∂N |N=0 < 0. When N > 0, the sign of ∂t∂N is ambiguous. The higher
the costs of raising a child, the greater pCˆh

is. Once these costs are high enough to make
∂t
∂N > 0, one more child in the family implies a longer migration duration of the parent.
However, the costs of raising children are actually not fixed because of the economies
of scale in raising children. The marginal money costs and time costs of raising children
are diminishing (Holmes and Tiefenthaler 1997; McClements 1977): ∂(pCˆh)
∂N < 0. Then the
greater the N , the more likely that ∂t
∂N is negative.
2.3.2 Age of children
Hypothesis 3: Migrants who are parents of younger children (babies or primary-school-
age children) return sooner than migrants whose children are older.
The money and time costs of raising children change by children’s age. Adult children
are supposed to be financially independent: wm − pCm = 0 in Eq. (11). They are not
the main reason for the psychic costs of migrants: s′(N) = 0 when N represents adult
children. Then ∂t
∂N(Adult Children) = 0, these adult children would not affect their parents’
migration duration theoretically. In reality, the duration will be affected due to parents’
concern for adult children and the money flows between them. If adult children help to
take care of migrants’ younger children, migrants may stay abroad longer because of the
reduced psychic costs.
Young children need both financial support and companionship from parents. Gen-
erally, among children under 18, older children are more expensive than younger ones,
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excluding child labor in some poor countries. According to the annual report of Expendi-
tures on Children by families from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
the annual expenditures overall in the United States on a child aged 12–17 years is about
10–20%2 per year higher than that on a child aged 0–11 years.3 Specifically, the difference
in consumption on food and health care captures the expenditure gap between younger
children and older ones, while the expenditures on education do not change much by
children’s age. However, in Mexico, the costs of secondary school are about 35% higher
than primary school (Wolff and Gurría 2005), thus the costs of raising a younger child
may be much lower than an older child: pCˆLittle Children < pCˆOlder Children.
In the meantime, migrants’ psychic costs change by the age of their children. Time
costs are directly related with these psychic costs, since spending time with children
is an efficient way for parents to build a close bond with them and reduce psychic
costs. Parents’ time spent with their children usually decreases as their children grow up
(Bittman 1999).4 Babies need to be taken care of all the time; primary school-aged chil-
dren are not quite involved in heavy homework load compared with high school-aged
children. They may have higher demand for parents’ time, resulting in lower discounts for
migrants compared to older children, ∂(s′(N))
∂(Age of the Additional Child) > 0. Their parents return
sooner.
In sum, raising younger children is time intensive, while raising children in secondary
school is money intensive. Migrants with older children may stay longer in the host
country than migrants who have younger children at home.
2.3.3 Gender of children
Hypothesis 4: Children’s gender affects parents’ migration duration. The effects change
by the home country.
Dustmann (2003a) finds that migrants traveling with daughters stay shorter abroad than
migrants traveling with sons, because migrants may want daughters to preserve traditions
in the home country while sons to pursue future economic careers in the host country.
However, the story may vary by country because of different cultures. For example, with
a dowry culture, the difference in the costs of raising a child by gender may highly depend
on price and dower of the future bride.
Mexico has a patriarchal culture (Massey et al. 2006), thus parents may intend to spend
more money and time on their sons than daughters. Their US duration may differ by the
gender of children.
2.3.4 Familymigration decisions
The model above assumes that migrants travel alone, while family members may travel
with them to the host country. Balancing the lower psychic costs and heavier finan-
cial burden due to migrating family members, how migrants make migration duration
decisions is an empirical question.
In Mexico, males, who are more economically active, dominate the migration flow to
the USA. Their wives usually travel to the USA for family reunion reasons, rather than
economic motivations. In the meantime, to avoid the risky change in occupation, wives
without a well-paid job inMexico may have more incentives to travel because of the lower
opportunity costs, compared to those with a good job. The negative selection and females’
lower labor force participation rate imply that the possible income decline from these
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spouses traveling may not be economically significant. When the increase in utility from
the companionship is higher than the decrease in utility from increased living costs and
declined income of their wives, migrants traveling with wives stay longer abroad than
those with wives waiting in the home country. Once their wives can get a good job in the
host country, the migrants would stay even longer.
Children, without an income for the family, would bring migrants a much heavier finan-
cial burden than migrating spouses if children live in the host country. The amount of
money spent on children is supposed to be larger than that on spouses, because par-
ents invest in their children, rather than just offer them basic financial supports. If the
psychic costs associated with children are the same as the psychic costs associated with
spouses, migrants traveling with children but without spouses may have a shorter stay
than migrants traveling with spouses but without children, since supporting a child in the
host country is more costly.
When migrants travel alone, to reduce psychic costs, they may make multiple trips,
leading to a longer total duration. Furthermore, family composition may change by
migrants’ experience in the host country.
In addition, people may make marital decisions, fertility decisions, and migration deci-
sions simultaneously. If they decide to stay long in the host country, they may prefer to
be single or have no children. The causality between family composition and migration
duration is unclear.
2.4 Human capital
The above model also suggests that human capital, which mainly affects migrants’ earn-
ings, would be an important determinant of migration duration. The higher the education
level (E), the greater the wage rates: ∂wi
∂E > 0, i = f or h. The effect of education level on











The sign of d td E is ambiguous, because
∂t
∂wh < 0 in Eq. (8) while the sign of
∂t
∂wf in Eq. (7)
is uncertain. When ∂t
∂wf < 0,
d t
d E < 0. Migrants with more years of schooling return to
their home country sooner.
When ∂t
∂wf > 0, the sign of
d t
d E depends on the comparison of the absolute values
of the two components on the right-hand side of Eq. (12). The value of ∂wf
∂E may be
highly related to the matching of migrants’ job search in the host country. Low-educated
migrants are usually undereducated for their jobs compared to native workers, while high-
educated migrants are often overeducated (Chiswick and Miller 2008).5 An extra year
of schooling improves the matching in labor market for undereducated migrants, while
it impairs the matching for overeducated migrants. Also, Mincer Equation implies that
∂2wf






∂E |low E >
∂wf
∂E |high E. When
d t
d E |low E > 0 > d td E |high E, there is probably a threshold education level for migrants.
The length of migration increases as education levels rise up from low values to the
threshold and then declines as education levels climb to values beyond the threshold.
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However, if d td E |low E < 0 < d td E |high E, the threshold may still exist, but the story on
each side may change.
Human capital would also be associated with migrants’ psychic costs. For example,
better host country language skills, which raise migrants’ earnings in the host coun-
try (Chiswick 1998; Dustmann and Van Soest 2002), help migrants to adapt to the new
environment at the same time, probably leading to lower psychic costs.
2.5 Other determinants
The higher the costs of migration are, the longer time period in the host country is needed
to achieve a positive net present value of migration (Chiswick 1999). A longer distance
between the origin and destination, usually suggesting more expensive trips in time if not
also inmoney, leads to fewer trips and a longer duration for each trip. In addition, the legal
status of migrants is highly correlated with migration costs and economic opportunities
in the host country, influencing the migration stay.
Other determinants of Mexican migrants’ US duration include migrants’ characteris-
tics, exchange rates, economic conditions, and immigration policies. How migrants get
a job abroad reflects their abilities and social connections. The exchange rates have both
an income effect and substitution effect: if US Dollars are more valuable compared with
Mexico Pesos, the income effect of higher exchange rates suggests migrants to return
sooner, since the US Dollars they earn in the host country give more pesos in Mexico;
however, the substitution effect attracts migrants to stay longer for more expensive cur-
rency. Furthermore, if the unemployment rates are high in the US but low in Mexico,
migrants may return sooner because finding a job may be more difficult in the US than
in Mexico. Regarding the US immigration policy, Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), which was enacted in 1986 in the US, reformed the US immigration law. Requir-
ing employers to attest to their employees’ migration status and making it illegal to
knowingly hire or recruit illegal migrants, the IRCA affects migrants’ job opportunities in
the US.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data source
The data for the empirical study are from theMexicanMigration Project (MMP), which is
a unique source of data on the contemporary Mexican immigration to the United States.6
It is specially designed to capture the experiences of those who transit back and forth
between Mexico and the US. Each year, the MMP randomly samples households in 3–5
communities located throughout Mexico when seasonal migrants tend to return home.
Following completion of the Mexican surveys, interviewers travel to destination areas in
the US to survey 10–20 out-migrant households from the same communities. Although
the MMP is not strictly representative of migrants in Mexico, it offers data with a high
degree of representativeness at the community level, and it provides information on the
labor history of migrants and detailed information on their first and last US trips.
To capture unobserved heterogeneity among individuals, I focus on migrants’ all US
trips. In addition, to explore possible determinants, I study the duration of migrants’ first
and last US trips due to their better records, especially the last trip.7
My sample includes male migrants aged 15–65 who were household heads surveyed
during the years 1982–2013, dropping females because of its small proportion. Excluding
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observations that havemissing values for key variables in the analysis, I get 5374migrants’
17,052 trips to the US; 4894 migrants for the last US trip; 3729 migrants for the first US
trip.
Empirically, the main questions can be rephrased as: How does the family composition
affect Mexican migrants’ duration in the US? What is the relationship between migrants’
migration duration and their education level? How do other determinants influence the
migration duration?
3.2 Hazard model
Return migrants’ duration in the US is known and certain (uncensored observations),
while the duration of migrants who have not yet returned from their current trip in the
US is not completed (censored observations). Apparently, ordinary least squares (OLS)-
related specifications are not applicable mainly because they do not distinguish between
censored and uncensored observations. Therefore, to test my hypotheses, I use the hazard
models, which are widely used in the literature of migration (Aydemir and Robinson 2008;
Bijwaard 2010; Bijwaard and van Doeselaar 2014; Bijwaard et al. 2014; Dustmann and
Weiss 2007; Kırdar 2009; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005).8 The following is an explanation
for the Cox proportional hazard model that I borrow from Cleves (2008).
LetT be a non-negative random variable indicating time until return. It has a probability
density function, f (t), and a cumulative distribution function F(t) = Pr(T ≤ t). Then
the hazard function, h(t), represents the instantaneous possibility of return conditional
on stay in the host country to time t,
h(t) = lim
t→0+




where S(t) = 1 − F(t) is the the survival function, showing the probability that T is at
least as great as a value t.
Define the cumulative hazard function, H(t) = ∫ t0h(u)du, then S(t) = exp(−H(t)).9
3.3 Explanatory variables and interpretation
In this paper, the hazard function depends on a vector of explanatory variables X with
unknown coefficients β . The hazard function is factored as
h(t|X) = h(t) exp(β ′X),
the possibility of return is allowed to vary with exogenous variables. I focus on the fam-
ily composition, education level, and some other determinants of migrants’ hazard rate
to return or migration duration. The definition of variables of interests is in Table 1. All
explanatory variables, except for Spouse Visit and English Proficiency10, are measured
upon migrants’ arrival in the USA for each trip. The aim is to avoid the the time-variance
and endogeneity of these variables. Also, these variables are relatively stable over time.
More specific information about how the Coxmodel is estimated is shown in Appendix.11
The sign of the coefficient indicates how an explanatory variable affects the hazard rate.
The hazard ratio (HR) can be calculated by exponentiating the coefficient. If β is positive,
HR = exp(β > 0) > 1, then one unit increase in variable X increases the hazard by
HR − 1 and therefore decreases the migration duration. If the coefficient β is negative,
HR = exp(β < 0) < 1, then one unit increase in variable X decreases the hazard by
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Table 1 Definition of variables
Variables Definition
Duration of each (the last) US trip (months) Individual’s duration for each (the last) US trip
Entire US duration (months) Individual’s entire US duration for all US trips
Age (years) Individual’s age at the time of migration
Years of schooling Individual’s year of schooling at the arrival year of each
(the last) US trip
Consensual union Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is in a
consensual union at the arrival year of each (the last)
US trip
Never married Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual has never
married before the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Once married not now Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual has once
married but is not married at the arrival year of each
(the last) US trip
Currently married Benchmark Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is
married at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of children Number of children at the arrival year of each (the last)
US trip
Num. of children under 18 Number of children under 18 at the arrival year of each
(the last) US trip
Number of adult children Number of children over 18 at the arrival year of each
(the last) US trip
Num. of adult daughters Number of daughters over 18 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of adult sons Number of sons over 18 at the arrival year of each (the
last) US trip
Num. of daughters under 18 Number of daughters under 18 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of sons under 18 Number of sons under 18 at the arrival year of each
(the last) US trip
Num. of children aged 0–4 Number of children aged 0–4 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of children aged 5–8 Number of children aged 5–8 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of children aged 9–12 Number of children aged 9–12 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of children aged 13–16 Number of children aged 13–16 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of children aged 17–18 Number of children aged 17–18 at the arrival year of
each (the last) US trip
Num. of children under 18 traveling Number of children under 18 traveling with their
parents at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of children under 18 waiting Number of children under 18 staying in the home
country at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of adult children traveling Number of children over 18 traveling with fathers at
the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of adult children waiting Number of children over 18 staying in the home
country at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of sons under 18 traveling Number of sons under 18 traveling with fathers at the
arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of daughters under 18 traveling Number of daughters under 18 traveling with fathers
at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of sons under 18 waiting Number of sons under 18 staying in the home country
at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Num. of daughters under 18 waiting Number of daughters under 18 staying in the home
country at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
Spouse traveling with Dichotomous variable = 1 if migrant’s wife travels
with him at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip
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Table 1 Definition of variables (Continued)
Spouse visited Dichotomous variable = 1 if migrant’s wife visits him
in each (the last) US trip
Spouse waiting Benchmark: no wife or wife not traveling with them
at the arrival year of each (the last) US trip and not
visiting
Number of US trips Individual’s accumulated number of US trips before
each (the last) US trip
Green card or citizenship Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual holds green
card or citizenship when entering the US in each (the
last) US trip
Visa Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual holds a legal
visa when entering the US in each (the last) US trip
Travel illegally Benchmark: no green card, citizenship, nor legal visa
English proficiency (0–4 scale) Host country language proficiency, 4 indicates the
highest English proficiency
IRCAa Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual migrated after
1986
Searched job Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual gets a job by
searching in each (the last) US trip
Contracted job Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual gets a
contracted jobwhen enter the US in each (the last) US
trip
Recommended job Benchmark: dichotomous variable = 1 if individual
gets a job by others’ recommendation when entering
the US in each (the last) US trip
Other job Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual gets a job in
other ways when entering the US in each (the last) US
trip
No job Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual does not have
a job in each (the last) US trip
Distance between Mexico and the US (km) Distance between the states in Mexico and the states
in the US
Difference in unemployment rate (US-Mexico) Unemployment rate at the arrival year in the
US-unemployment rate at the arrival year in Mexico
Exchange rate Exchange rate (USD/Mexican Peso)
Monthly wage in the US (Dollars) Individual’s monthly wage in the US (real)
aThe Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), enacted November 6, 1986, also known as Simpson-Mazzoli Act, is an Act of
Congress which reformed United States immigration law. It was an attempt to solve the immigration problem during 198
1−HR and increases the duration. The statistical significance of the coefficient indicates
the statistical significance of these changes in the migration duration.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics for migrants’ all US trips and their last US
trip, respectively.
In Table 2, the first pair of columns are for the entire sample, in which most of the
male household heads (94%) are married when they migrate. The average number of
children under age 18 is 3.02,12 and average number of children under age 18 who wait
in the home country when their fathers travel is 2.97: most of the males travel without
children. Also, the average number of sons (1.48) and daughters (1.44) under age 18 are
almost the same.13 On average, the number of children aged 0–4 has the highest mean
value among different child age groups. Also, most male migrants move without spouses
traveling together (96% of trips).
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Table 2 Summary statistics of MMP male household heads’ all US trips
Entire sample Uncensored Censored
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Duration of each trip (months) 17.79 37.98 14.12* 28.53 71.16 86.81
Age (years) 34.11 9.69 34.16* 9.70 33.37 9.55
Years of schooling 4.27 3.43 4.11* 3.36 6.58 3.62
Consensual union (%) 4 20 4* 19 10 30
Never married (%) 1 11 1* 10 5 21
Once married but not now (%) 0.4 6 0.4* 6 1 11
Currently married (%) 94 23 95* 22 84 36
Num. of children under 18 3.02 2.34 3.07* 2.36 2.24 1.82
Num. of adult children 0.60 1.62 0.60 1.63 0.51 1.49
Num. of daughters under 18 1.44 1.41 1.46* 1.42 1.12 1.26
Num. of sons under 18 1.48 1.43 1.51* 1.45 1.05 1.09
Num. of children aged 0–4 0.96 0.96 0.99* 0.97 0.61 0.75
Num. of children aged 5–8 0.83 0.97 0.84* 0.98 0.55 0.77
Num. of children aged 9–12 0.69 0.97 0.70* 0.98 0.48 0.77
Num. of children aged 13–16 0.53 0.91 0.54* 0.92 0.41 0.74
Num. of children aged 17–18 0.21 0.48 0.21 0.48 0.18 0.44
Num. of children under 18 traveling 0.05 0.33 0.04* 0.29 0.13 0.63
Num. of children under 18 waiting 2.97 2.33 3.03* 2.35 2.11 1.81
Num. of adult children traveling 0.04 0.28 0.04* 0.26 0.08 0.46
Num. of adult children waiting 0.56 1.54 0.57* 1.56 0.43 1.32
Num. of sons under 18 traveling 0.03 0.22 0.03* 0.21 0.07 0.39
Num. of daughters under 18 traveling 0.02 0.17 0.01* 0.15 0.06 0.34
Num. of sons under 18 waiting 1.45 1.42 1.49* 1.44 0.98 1.07
Num. of daughters under 18 waiting 1.42 1.41 1.44* 1.42 1.06 1.24
Spouse traveling with (%) 3 17 3* 16 8 27
Spouse visited (%) 1 11 1* 9 6 24
Spouse waiting (%) 96 20 97* 18 86 35
Number of US trips 6.18 6.57 6.36* 6.66 3.53 4.20
Green card or citizenship (%) 25 43 25* 43 34 47
Visa (%) 15 35 16* 36 3 16
Travel illegally (%) 60 49 60* 49 63 48
IRCA (%) 39 49 36* 48 82 39
Distance between Mexico-US (km) 1418 375 1415* 375 1462 374
US unemployment rate 6.07 1.47 6.09* 1.48 5.81 1.23
Mexico unemployment rate 4.55 1.66 4.62* 1.67 3.78 1.33
Exchange rate 2.60 3.43 2.36* 3.27 5.50 3.99
Num. of observations 17,052 15,954 (94%) 1098 (6%)
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities which were surveyed from 1982–2013
STD standard deviation
*Difference between means (uncensored and censored) is significant at the .05 level. Variables US Unemployment Rate,Mexico
Unemployment Rate, Exchange Rate, have missing values, thus fewer observations
Some indicators are only available for the last US trip. In Table 3, the average
English proficiency for the entire sample is 1.24 which is between 1 (Do not speak,
but understand some) and 2 (Do not speak, but understand much).14 Two percent of
migrants have no job, suggesting that most of the sample work to earn money in the
USA.15
The second pair of columns in Tables 2 and 3 is for the finished US trips (Uncensored),
and the last pair of columns is for the unfinished trips (Censored). In Table 3, the second
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Table 3 Summary statistics of MMP male household heads’ last US trip
Entire sample Uncensored Censored
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Duration of the last US trip (months) 30.73 58.41 19.33* 38.63 70.18 89.74
Age (years) 34.70 10.03 35.10* 10.08 33.32 9.76
Years of schooling 5.27 3.81 4.90* 3.78 6.54 3.65
Consensual union (%) 7 26 7* 26 9 29
Never married (%) 2 15 1* 11 6 23
Once married but not now (%) 1 8 1 7 1 10
Currently married (%) 90 30 91* 28 84 36
Num. of children under 18 2.70 2.15 2.84* 2.22 2.22 1.82
Num. of adult children 0.66 1.72 0.69* 1.77 0.55 1.53
Num. of daughters under 18 1.31 1.33 1.37* 1.36 1.10 1.22
Num. of sons under 18 1.31 1.63 1.38* 1.33 1.05 1.10
Num. of children aged 0–4 0.79 1.29 0.84* 0.91 0.62 0.76
Num. of children aged 5–8 0.71 0.90 0.75* 0.93 0.55 0.76
Num. of children aged 9–12 0.60 0.89 0.64* 0.92 0.47 0.76
Num. of children aged 13–16 0.50 0.87 0.53* 0.90 0.40 0.75
Num. of children aged 17–18 0.21 0.48 0.22* 0.49 0.17 0.43
Num. of children under 18 traveling 0.07 0.43 0.06* 0.35 0.13 0.62
Num. of children under 18 waiting 2.63 2.16 2.78* 2.22 2.09 1.81
Num. of adult children traveling 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.40 0.09 0.48
Num. of adult children waiting 0.59 1.58 0.62* 1.63 0.46 1.37
Num. of sons under 18 traveling 0.05 0.28 0.04* 0.24 0.08 0.40
Num. of daughters under 18 traveling 0.03 0.22 0.02* 0.18 0.06 0.32
Num. of sons under 18 waiting 1.26 1.28 1.35* 1.32 0.97 1.07
Num. of daughters under 18 waiting 1.28 1.33 1.35* 1.36 1.05 1.21
Spouse traveling with (%) 7 26 5* 23 13 34
Spouse visited (%) 2 13 1* 9 5 22
Spouse waiting (%) 91 29 94* 24 82 39
Number of US trips 3.97 4.96 3.97 5.04 3.97 4.65
Green card or citizenship (%) 22 41 16* 36 42 49
Visa (%) 11 31 14* 34 3 16
Travel illegally (%) 67 47 71* 45 55 50
English proficiency 1.24 1.33 0.99* 1.21 2.11 1.38
IRCA (%) 61 49 55* 50 81 40
Searched job (%) 26 44 25* 43 29 45
Contracted job (%) 12 32 15* 35 3 16
Recommended job (%) 59 49 58* 49 65 48
Other job (%) 1 8 0 7 1 10
No job (%) 2 16 3 16 2 15
Distance between Mexico-US (km) 1401 409 1385* 417 1455 372
US unemployment rate 5.91 1.31 5.94* 1.33 5.82 1.24
Mexico unemployment rate 4.08 1.52 4.18* 1.57 3.76 1.32
Exchange rate 4.30 3.99 3.95* 3.93 5.37 3.97
Monthly wage in the US ($) 1063.59 1175.25 961.76* 857.78 1419.42 1864.64
Num. of observations 4894 3797 (78%) 1097 (22%)
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities which were surveyed from 1982–2013
STD standard deviation
*Difference between means (uncensored and censored) is significant at the .05 level. Variables US Unemployment Rate,Mexico
Unemployment Rate, Exchange Rate,MonthWage in the US have missing values, thus fewer observations
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and last pairs of columns are for return migrants and migrants who are still in the USA
at the time of survey (Stayer), respectively. On average, return migrants and stayers differ
significantly in many variables: return migrants have a shorter migration duration, have
fewer years of schooling, are more likely to be currently married, and have more children
under age 18. It seems that migrants with more family members are more likely to return
to Mexico. Also, compared with stayers, return migrants tend to be illegal migrants, have
lower English proficiency, travel before IRCA, and live in Mexican communities which
are closer to their destinations.
4 Hazardmodel results
4.1 All US trips
The basic results of applying the Cox hazard model to all US trips are presented in Table 4
in which the hazard ratios are reported.16 Errors are clustered at individual level.17
4.1.1 Marital status and children
In Table 4, using the Currently Married as the benchmark, Consensual Union, Never
Married, and Once Married but Not Now have a hazard ratio which is signifi-
cantly less than 1. Migrants in these three categories, compared with the currently
married, have a lower hazard rate (possibility of return) and a longer duration in
the USA. Compared to marriage, consensual union may require less commitment,
thus married men may feel more responsible for the family and more obligated to
return. Never married men have the lowest hazard, and thus the longest stay. The
divorced or separated or widowed migrants in the category Once Married but Not
Now have a shorter stay than never married migrants, but the difference is not
significant.
In Table 4 column (2), onemore child under 18 increases fathers’ hazard by 1.90%, lead-
ing to a shorter stay in the USA. Though an extra child causes additional financial burden
onmigrants and encourages them to extend the length of stay, the increased psychic costs
drive them to return sooner. Adult children’s influence is barely significant.
Table 4 column (3) groups children under 18 by gender. One more son under
18 increases fathers’ hazard of returning significantly, while daughters do not have
a significant effect though the hazard ratio is greater than 1. Although the dif-
ference in hazard ratio (coefficient) is not statistically significant under the Wald
test, it may reflect the patriarchal culture in Mexico to some degree. Migrants
with sons may feel more of a responsibility to return home to mentor sons than
daughters.
In addition, column (4) splits number of children under 18 by age. The number of
children aged 0–12 has a hazard ratio which is significantly greater than 1 and dif-
ferent from the hazard ratios of children aged 13–18.18 Fathers with more children
aged 0–12 have shorter stays, when other variables, including Age, remain constant.
Raising younger children (aged 0–12) is relatively more time intensive and less money
intensive.
4.1.2 Other determinants
The results for Schooling are consistent across specifications. In Table 4 column (1),
one more year of schooling decreases the hazard rate (possibility of return) by 5.35%.19
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Table 4 Cox model results for male household heads’ duration among all US trips
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 1.002 0.979** 0.980** 0.977**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
School 0.945*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.949***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
School squared 1.002* 1.002* 1.002* 1.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Consensual union 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.768***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Never married 0.633*** 0.638*** 0.636*** 0.670***
(0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.086)
Once married but not now 0.675** 0.687** 0.683** 0.705**
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.118)
Num. of children under 18 1.019**
(0.008)
Num. of adult children 0.975* 0.974* 0.978
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Num. of daughters under 18 1.008
(0.012)
Num. of sons under 18 1.027**
(0.011)
Num. of children aged 0–4 1.069***
(0.013)
Num. of children aged 5–8 1.024**
(0.012)
Num. of children aged 9–12 1.031***
(0.012)
Num. of children aged 13–16 0.989
(0.013)
Num. of children aged 17–18 1.007
(0.021)
Num. of previous US trips 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Green card/citizen 0.883*** 0.890*** 0.889*** 0.894***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Visa 2.118*** 2.135*** 2.134*** 2.125***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091)
IRCA 0.913*** 0.923*** 0.922*** 0.941**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Mex US dist 0.9998*** 0.9998*** 0.9998*** 0.9998***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Log pseudolikelihood –139,830.5 –139,815.33 –139,815.18 –139,784.66
Num. of obs 17,052 17,052 17,052 17,052
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities surveyed from 1982–2013
***Significant at 0.01; **significant at 0.05 level; *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
In addition, having illegal migrants as the benchmark, green card holders or citi-
zens in the USA are expected to stay longer in the USA, because they have gotten
the necessary certification to stay legally in the USA as long as they want. Migrants
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with legal visas stay shorter than illegal migrants, probably because it is more costly
for illegal migrants to cross the border, and they are more willing to extend the
US experience to earn sufficient money to cover the higher costs. Also, most of the
visa holders get the visa because of contracted jobs. When the contract ends, the
migrants have to go home. They cannot make duration decisions as freely as illegal
migrants.
4.2 Last US trip
Studying migrants’ last US trip helps to understand the selection among migrants on
observable variables. The basic results from the Cox hazard model for the male Mexican
migrants in their last US trip are presented in Table 5. Migrants stay shorter when
they are married, have more children under 18, especially children aged 0–12 and
boys.
4.2.1 Human capital
In Table 5 column (1), one more year of schooling decreases the hazard rate (possibility
of return) by 8.48%.20
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the hazard of returning and years of schooling,
which is a U-shaped graph. The bottom of the graph lies at around 11 years, indicat-
ing that duration is an inverted U function with respect to years of schooling with the
peak at 11 years. In their last US trip, 92% migrants have years of schooling under or
equal to 11: among those with 11 or fewer years of schooling, the hazard of returning
decreases as years of schooling increase. Thus, more educated migrants stay longer in
the USA. Migrants with very low education levels may have difficultly to find a good
job and fulfill their expectations in the USA, feeling disappointed, so they may return
sooner. Among migrants with 11 or more years of schooling, more educated ones stay
shorter. It may be easier for them to achieve their targets of earnings in the USA, or
get better-paid jobs upon returning because of the lower supply of high educated peo-
ple in Mexico than the USA. Figure 2 shows the similar graph using the sample with all
US trips.
Occupation, which is highly correlated with schooling, is not included in this study,
mainly because migrants’ occupations in the USA are time-variant and highly endoge-
nous. Having variables for migrants’ occupations before migration in the specifications
(not shown here), migrants who have Mexican jobs in manufacturing and service sectors
stay longer than migrants who are unemployed or have jobs in sales or transporta-
tion sectors in Mexico. Migrants who have a professional job in Mexico have the
shortest stay. This is consistent with the analysis for schooling. The most educated
migrants with professional jobs and the least educated migrants with no job return
sooner.
In Table 5 columns (2)–(5), overall, with higher English proficiency, migrants
are more likely to stay longer in the USA. The average level of migrants’ English
proficiency is low.21 Most of the migrants who have better English skills (more
human capital) may adapt to the new environment better, receiving higher wage
rates and suffering less psychic costs. In the meantime, longer durations suggest
migrants’ longer exposures to English (Chiswick 1978), improving their language
skills.22
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Table 5 Cox model results for male household heads’ duration in the last trip (selected variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schooling 0.911*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.959*** 0.961***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Schooling squared 1.004*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Consensual union 0.813*** 0.823*** 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.825***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Never married 0.431*** 0.456*** 0.458*** 0.460*** 0.470***
(0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069)
Once married but not now 0.552*** 0.584*** 0.586*** 0.588*** 0.604***
(0.087) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098)
Num. of children under 18 1.019**
(0.010)
Num. of daughters under 18 1.010
(0.015)
Num. of sons under 18 1.033**
(0.015)
Num. of children aged 0–4 1.030
(0.024)
Num. of children aged 5–8 1.053**
(0.024)
Num. of children aged 9–12 1.054**
(0.025)
Num. of children aged 13–16 0.990
(0.027)
Num. of children aged 17–18 1.007
(0.042)
Total num. of US trips 1.053*** 1.059*** 1.060*** 1.060*** 1.060***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance (Mexico-US) 0.9996*** 0.9996*** 0.9996*** 0.9996*** 0.9996***
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
IRCA 1.027 1.078* 1.095** 1.095** 1.115***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
English proficiency 0.714*** 0.714*** 0.715*** 0.715***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Searched job 0.930* 0.931* 0.929* 0.930*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Contracted job 1.552*** 1.556*** 1.556*** 1.554***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Other job 0.694 0.708 0.710 0.718
(0.166) (0.168) (0.169) (0.168)
No job 1.516** 1.519** 1.506** 1.529**
(0.299) (0.304) (0.303) (0.308)
Log pseudolikelihood –28,839.38 –28,539.58 –28,535.69 –28,534.58 –28,528.17
Num. of obs 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities surveyed from 1982–2013
***Significant at 0.01; **significant at 0.05 level; *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
4.2.2 Other determinants
Tables 4 and 5 show different results for IRCA. The possible reason is that migrants who
travel before IRCA are different with migrants who travel after IRCA in unobservable
factors.
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Fig. 1 The relationship between hazard of return and years of schooling is U shaped: migrants with less than
11 years of schooling are more likely to stay in the USA as the years of schooling increases. For migrants
whose years of schooling is above 11 years, they are more willing to return as they have more years of
schooling. From Table 2, the average years of schooling is 5.27. Also, 92% of migrants have years of schooling
under or equal 11 in the last US trip; so generally, the rate of returning decreases as the education level goes
up, and migrants will stay longer in the USA
In Table 5, migrants without a job return sooner than migrants who get their job by
recommendation (benchmark), which probably suggests a stronger social network. Also,
contracted migrants have to return when they finish their contract; their choices are more
limited than migrants who get a job by recommendation or searching by themselves.
Migrants who get the job by searching may have higher transferable abilities or higher
English proficiency, and they should be able to find jobs by themselves even if they lose
the first job in the USA, thus they may have longer stays compared with the benchmark.
After adding exchange rate and unemployment rates in the analysis, Table 6 reports that
the substitution effect from a higher exchange rate outweighs its income effect: migrants
are willing to stay longer in the USA. The unemployment rate in Mexico or the USA has
either a statistically insignificant or an economically insignificant effect on the migration
Fig. 2 The relationship between hazard of return and years of schooling is U shaped. From Table 1, the
average years of schooling is 4.27. Also, 95% of observations have years of schooling under or equal 11 in the
first US trip; so generally, the rate of returning decreases as the education level goes up, and migrants will
stay longer in the US
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Table 6 Cox results for male household heads’ duration - economic conditions (selected variables)
All US trips Last US trip
(1) (2) (3)
US annual unemployment rate 1.005 1.000 0.984
(0.009) (0.018) (0.021)
Mexico annual unemployment rate 0.876 1.000*** 1.000
(0.749) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Exchange rate (USD/Peso) 0.957*** 0.968*** 0.975***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)




Log pseudolikelihood –97,534.874 –24,786.22 –19,546.70
Num. of obs 12,520 4370 3548
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities which were surveyed from 1982–2013
***Significant at 0.01; **significant at 0.05 level; *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
duration. Also, this table shows that higher wage rates in the USA are associated with
longer stays.
Though not shown here, the robustness check with migrants’ first US trip shows
consistent results with Table 5.
4.3 Robust check with the total duration
In Table 7, I use the total US duration as the dependent variable. Independent variables
are measured inmigrants’ first US trip. All results are consistent with the previous results.
Migrants who are married, have more sons under 18 return sooner.
Table 7 Cox results for male household heads’ total duration (selected variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Consensual union 0.896 0.920 0.924 0.925 0.925
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
Never married 0.637*** 0.662*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.686***
(0.072) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088)
Once married but not now 0.796 0.804 0.807 0.795 0.808
(0.140) (0.148) (0.154) (0.154) (0.157)
Num. of children under 18 1.026**
(0.012)
Num. of daughters under 18 1.005
(0.020)
Num. of sons under 18 1.046***
(0.018)
Num. of children aged 5–8 1.043*
(0.026)
Total num. of US trips 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.931***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log pseudolikelihood –23,467.27 –23,221.83 –23,218.50 –23,217.32 –23,214.52
Num. of obs 3614 3614 3614 3614 3614
Source: Data are from the MMP. They cover 143 communities surveyed from 1982–2013
***Significant at 0.01; **significant at 0.05 level; *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
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Number of US Trips is a time-invariant variable in Table 4 (Num. of Previous US Trips)
for each trip and Table 5 (Total Num. of US Trips) for the last US trip . Even having more
trips before, migrants experience shorter stays in the each trip.23 Thoughmigration dura-
tion of each trip is shorter, Table 7 shows that the total duration is longer for migrants
with more trips.
Furthermore, Table 7 shows that having the same number of US trips, longer distances
between migrants’ home in Mexico and their destinations in the USA give a longer stay.
This is consistent with Tables 4 and 5.
4.4 Adult children take care of young children
Table 8 adds the interaction terms between variables for adult children and children under
18 into regressions. The interaction terms between Num. of Sons under 18 and Num. of
Adult Children in columns (1) and (4) have a hazard ratio which is significantly less than
1. Adult children do not have a direct effect on their fathers’ migration duration. But
they may take care of their younger siblings by spending more time, rather than money,
with them. Their caring decreases their fathers’ psychic costs and lengthens the duration.
However, this only holds true for sons.
The help offered by adult children to look after little children aged 0–4 matters sig-
nificantly in columns (2) and (5). Taking care of a baby requires more time. With adult
children around babies, fathers in the USA take a relief and stay longer.
Adult daughters are more supposed to take care of younger brothers, columns (3) and
(6) verify this. Adding the interaction term between Num. of Adult Daughters and vari-
ables for different age groups for children shows that fathers stay longer if their adult
daughters take care of children under 4.
4.5 Traveling or waiting
Table 9 focuses on the story of family members traveling to the host country or waiting
in the home country. Columns (1) and (5) split the number of children into the number
of children under 18 traveling with their fathers, the number of children under 18 waiting
in Mexico, the number of adult children traveling with their fathers, and the number of
adult children waiting in Mexico.
Adult children have no significant effect on their father’s duration in the USA, regard-
less of whether they travel or wait. In column (1), one more child under 18 traveling
decreases the hazard of returning by 23.5% (100 − 76.50%), holding other variables con-
stant, while one more child under 18 waiting in Mexico increases it by 2.33% (102.33 −
100%). Having children traveling with, migrants suffer lower psychic costs, which out-
weigh the increase in the costs of raising children in a more expensive country. Fathers
with children in the USA stay longer than fathers having children waiting in the home
country.
Though Num. of Daughters Waiting has no significant coefficient, the companionship
offered by daughters in the host country has an effect as important as sons statistically.
This is shown in Table 9 columns (2) and (5), which dividesNum. of Children under 18 by
gender and by whether they travel or not.
In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), I use a dichotomous variable, Married (Religious
or Civil), to replace the set of dichotomous variables for marital status, and add vari-








Table 8 Cox results for male household heads’ duration - interactions between adult children and children under 18 (selected variables)
All US trips The last trip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Num. of adult children 0.993 0.980 0.997 0.993
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Num. of adult daughters 1.031 0.967
(0.027) (0.031)
Num. of adult sons 0.964* 0.982
(0.021) (0.024)
Num. of daughters under 18 1.010 1.012 1.014 1.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Num. of sons under 18 1.035*** 1.036*** 1.045*** 1.043***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Num. of daughters under 18 × num. of adult children 0.997 0.997
(0.006) (0.008)
Num. of sons under 18 × num. of adult children 0.988* 0.984*
(0.006) (0.009)
Num. of daughters under 18 × num. of adult daughters 0.988 1.010
(0.010) (0.013)
Num. of sons under 18 × num. of adult daughters 0.978** 0.984* 0.978*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Num. of children aged 0–4 1.074*** 1.047*
(0.013) (0.025)
Num. of children aged 5–8 1.022* 1.046*
(0.012) (0.025)
Num. of children aged 9–12 1.038*** 1.064**
(0.013) (0.028)









Table 8 Cox results for male household heads’ duration - interactions between adult children and children under 18 (selected variables) (Continued)
Num. of children aged 0–4 × num. of adult children 0.971** 0.918***
(0.014) (0.024)
Num. of children aged 5–8 × num. of adult children 1.007 1.029
(0.010) (0.018)
Num. of children aged 9–12 × num. of adult children 0.989 0.991
(0.008) (0.015)
Num. of children aged 13–16 × num. of adult children 0.998 0.998
(0.006) (0.013)
Log pseudolikelihood –139,809.08 –139,778.99 –139,803.68 –28,531.94 –28,522.27 –28,510.67
Num. of obs 17,052 17,052 17,052 4894 4894 4894
Source: Data are from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). They cover 143 communities which were surveyed from 1982–2013








Table 9 Cox model results for male household heads’ duration considering family members traveling or waiting (selected variables)
All US trips The last trip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Consensual union 0.758*** 0.757*** 0.818*** 0.818***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
Never married 0.633*** 0.632*** 0.454*** 0.456***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.066) (0.066)
Once married but not now 0.690** 0.685** 0.596*** 0.598***
(0.118) (0.117) (0.099) (0.099)
Married 1.556*** 1.588*** 2.108*** 2.196***
(0.164) (0.167) (0.243) (0.255)
Num. of children under 18 waiting 1.023*** 1.020** 1.018** 1.023** 1.017* 1.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Num. of children under 18 traveling 0.765*** 0.808*** 0.809*** 0.773*** 0.845*** 0.833***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.040) (0.040)
Num. of adult children waiting 0.979 0.978 0.978 0.977 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.985
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Num. of adult children traveling 0.936* 0.939* 0.937* 0.931** 0.941 0.944 0.943 0.950
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044)
Num. of daughters under 18 waiting 1.010 1.012
(0.012) (0.015)
Num. of sons under 18 waiting 1.033*** 1.038**
(0.011) (0.015)
Num. of daughters under 18 traveling 0.717*** 0.744***
(0.037) (0.059)









Table 9 Cox model results for male household heads’ duration considering family members traveling or waiting (selected variables) (Continued)
Spouse traveling with 0.630*** 0.613*** 0.589*** 0.555***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039)
Spouse visited 0.411*** 0.211***
(0.045) (0.032)
Total num. of US trips 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.060*** 1.060*** 1.059*** 1.058***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance (Mexico-US) 0.9998*** 0.9998*** 0.9998*** 0.9998*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Log pseudolikelihood –139,731.05 –139,729.74 –139,707.86 –139,633.21 –28,508.61 –28,507.19 –28,486.20 –28,419.71
Num. of obs 17,052 17,052 17,052 17,052 4894 4894 4894 4894
Source: Data are from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). They cover 143 communities which were surveyed from 1982–2013
***Significant at 0.01; **significant at 0.05 level; *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
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than married men with wives traveling with them, and the latter ones stay longer than
married men with their wives waiting in the home country. Married men with wives
visiting them during the migration duration stay even longer than men with spouses
traveling.
4.6 Robustness check with other survival models
When modeling a Cox proportional hazard model (and some other parametric models),
an important assumption is the proportional hazards: the hazard ratio is proportional
over the entire baseline. Actually, the specifications above fail the Schoenfeld Residual
test globally. But Hancock and Mueller (2010) mention that if this assumption is vio-
lated, it simply means that the coefficients represent a kind of “average” effect over the
period of observation, so the concerns about the violation of this assumption are often
unwarranted.24 However, this assumption may not be a problem. I utilize alternative
methods to fix the specifications.
The Piecewise-Constant Exponential (PCE) model is a semi-parametric continuous
time duration model as well. But it does not assume the hazard ratio is proportional.
Actually, it reveals how the hazard rate varies over time. I apply the PCE model to all
Cox specifications above, resulting in consistent conclusions. In addition, results from the
Stratified Cox models and logit models give consistent results with the Cox model.
Though the results of the above regressions support the utility maximization model
and corresponding hypotheses, the causality is not addressed if migration duration plans,
marriage and fertility decisions are simultaneously determined.
5 Conclusions
This paper builds a utility maximization model to show the trade-off between avoid-
ing psychic costs from missing family members and accumulating money to support
their consumption when economic migrants make decisions on the migration dura-
tion. The Cox models are employed to study the determinants of Mexican migrants’ US
duration.
Empirical results suggest that single men are more likely to have longer durations
than men in consensual unions, who then stay longer than married men. Fathers with
more children, especially more little children and boys, have shorter stays, because tak-
ing care of these children is more time intensive. Family members traveling with migrants
lengthen their migration duration.
In addition, there is a non-linear relationship between education and duration. A
threshold education level may exist. Migrants stay longer as years of schooling increase
from low levels to the threshold, and then stay shorter as years of schooling increases
to levels above the threshold. In Mexico-US migration, the threshold is around 11
years. The empirical results could change by migration flows. Finding out the thresh-
old education level could be meaningful to the migration policy design for both
countries.
The focus of this study is on the economic migrants whose main goal of migration is
wealth accumulation, meanwhile the arguments about the trade-off are still applicable to
family migrants whomigrate for family reunion. To decrease the psychic costs of concern-
ing family members abroad, people may give up their current job in the home country
and travel to the host country. When they hold a high paid job in the home country, they
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may feel more reluctant to move; at the same time, their high income in the home country
may shorten the duration of family members’ migration.
Endnotes
1The lifetime utility function in Dustmann (2003b) is U = tν(Cf ,α) + (1 − t)ν(Ch,β)
(Some notations have been changed). There is no discounting.
2The precise number varies by year and by the type of family and its income.
3The absolute difference is about $1,200-2,500 in 2013 (Lino 2014).
4There is not much work reporting that time use of parents on their children by the
children’s age. Bittman (1999) reports that in 1987 Finnish parents’ hours per week spent
in face-to-face childcare decrease as the age of the youngest child increases.
5The Table 3 in Chiswick and Miller (2008) shows that a large proportion of foreign
born workers who have years of schooling fewer than 14 were undereducated, but the
proportion declined sharply when they had more than 14 years of schooling, and most
of them were overeducated.
6The MMP is a bi-national project co-directed by Jorge Durand (University of
Guadalajara) and Douglas Massey (Princeton University).
7Since the first US trip is also the last US trip for migrants who only have one trip, the
focus is on the last US trip.
8Bijwaard (2010) mentions that ignoring a non-zero percentage of permanent
migrants will lead to biased inference applying Hazard models, however, the MMP does
not have enough information for me to distinguish permanent migrants from others.
9H(t) = ∫ t0 f (t)S(t)du = −∫ t0 1S(u) [ dduS(u)] du = −ln [S(t)], and S(t) = exp (−∫ t0h(u)du).
10Spouse’s visits happen during the household head’s stay in the US. The dataset only
has the English proficiency information for the last US trip, and it has not to be measured
at the very beginning of the last US trip. These two variables are highly endogenous.
11The Cox proportional hazards model makes no assumptions about the form of h(t)
(non-parametric part of the model). Once h(t) differs by individual, the hazard of trip j
of migrants i is hij(t|X) = h(t)αi exp(β ′Xij), a Cox regression with shared frailty can be
applied, capturing individual random effect.
1287% among all trips, 87% among the uncensored trips, and 82% among the
censored trips migrants have at least one child when they move to the US.
13The sum of average number of sons and daughters under 18 is slightly less than the
average number of children under 18, because the number of children is from “life143”
original data file, in which children’s gender is unknown. While number of sons
(daughters) under 18 is calculated based on “pers143” data file, in which some
observations have missing values for year of birth or some other relevant information,
resulting in the attrition. In addition, I ignored the death of a few children because of
their small proportion. Restrict to observations which have accurate record of children,
a robustness check gives consistent results.
14In the last US trip, among male migrants, 42.44% report “Doesn’t speak nor
understands;” 24.44% report “Doesn’t speak but understands a little;” 9.07% report
“Doesn’t speak but understands well;” 18.65% report “Both: speaks and understands a
little;” 6.42% report “Both: speaks and understands well.”
15Table 3 shows the frequency of distribution for how they get a job in the US. In
addition, among these migrants in their last US trip, 0.80% have a professional job;
35.73% are in the agriculture sector; 20.07% are skilled workers in manufacturing;
20.26% are unskilled workers in manufacturing; 16.98% are in the service sector; 2.79%
are sellers; 0.95% are in the transportation sector; 2.42% are unemployed.
16Since given correct assumption of the shape of hazard rate over time a parametric
model is always more efficient than other models, I use Generalized gamma model to
test whether Exponential model, Weibull model, Gompertz model, Lognormal model,
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Loglogistic model, and gamma model are appropriate. However none of them are
applicable.
17To capture the individual random effects, the Cox regression with shared frailty can
be applied, but it hardly shows the results given such a big dataset.
18The Wald test indicates that the coefficients on children aged 0-12 and children aged
13–18 are statistically significant.
19(100% − 94.49%) − (100.16% − 100%) = 5.51% − 0.16% = 5.35%.
20(100% − 91.11%) − (100.41% − 100%) = 8.89% − 0.41% = 8.48%.
21The average English proficiency for the entire sample is 1.24 which mean the average
level is between 1 (Do not speak, but understand some) and 2 (Do not speak, but
understand much).
22If I add an interaction between English Proficiency and Age in these specifications,
the hazard ratio of this interaction term is greater than 1. The effect of English
Proficiency on the duration is lower for aged migrants. But the Schooling does not show
any significant effects on English Proficiency’s effects on duration when having an
interaction between English Proficiency and Schooling.
23It is highly possible that more number of trips decrease fathers’ psychic costs. In fact,
the interaction between Num. of Children (under 18) Waiting and Total Num. of US
Trips from the last US trip has a hazard ratio which is barely significantly less than 1, and
so does the interaction betweenmarried and Total Num. of US Trips.
24See chapter 31 in Hancock and Mueller (2010).
Appendix
Estimating the Cox model
This is borrowed from Cleves (2008). Some notations have been changed.
The partial likelihood method cares about the ordering of the time of the migrants’
return occurrence.
Let R(tj) denote the number of cases that are at risk of experiencing an event (the deci-
sion of return) at time tj, that is, the “risk set”. Given that there is an event, the probability







where the equality holds because the baseline hazards cancel out.










where j denotes the N distinct event times. δj = 0 if a migrant has not returned at the
time of the survey (right-censored observations), δj = 1 if the migrant has returned to
Mexico (uncensored observations).











Then we maximize the equation above with respect to β . It should be noted that cen-
sored observations enter into the calculations only because they determine the size of the
risk set.
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